"Quora" story on "Japan's Greatest Weakness during WW II"

June 30, 2019 What was Japan's greatest weakness during WWII? Imperial Japan had several conspicuous weaknesses and opinions vary regarding which was the greatest weakness. This is a complex matter not admitting of a simplistic answer. IMO, Japan’s greatest weakness in the Pacific War was: Weak logistical capacity According to Military logistics Military logistics is the discipline of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of military forces. In its most comprehensive sense, it is those aspects or military operations that deal with: Design, development, acquisition, storage, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel. Transport of personnel. Acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities. Acquisition or furnishing of services. Medical and health service support. These are all simple to understand. Soldiers need to be fed and cared for properly to fight well. Military units need weapons, fuels and ammunitions. Without those critical necessities, a combatant nation will lose a war no matter how well-trained and brave its fighting men are. Let’s start off with a prelude: What is the one salient fact about Japan? . . . . . . . It is an island nation!! Also, here is another salient fact about Japan: It is very poor in natural resources. What is the implication of these 2 salient facts in the context of WW2? Being an island nation, Japan needed a strong navy to project power and defend the empire. At the same time, it needed a large fleet of supply ships to maintain its far-flung territories with a steady provision of ammunition, foods and other materials. Being poor in natural resources, Japan depended heavily on raw materials imported from its conquered territories to sustain industrial production, its war economy vital to keep the Japanese war machine running. To transport back to the Home Islands vast quantities of raw materials, a large merchant fleet was indispensable. The one thing that differentiates WW2 from the wars that preceded it was that it was a total war - a war in which all national assets: manpower, human talent, scientific and technological expertise, raw materials, economic power - are mobilized for the war effort. Of these assets, economic power played a decisive role in influencing the ultimate outcome of the war because it produced materials of all kinds to fight war - weapons, ammunition and foods. With regards to Japan, Japanese military leaders fully appreciated the war-winning potential of economic power as evident through a conclusion made in a study conducted by Japanese officers on WW1. In that study, Japanese officers concluded that Germany lost the war primarily to economic reasons. Specifically, Germany was deprived of vital commodities due to British naval blockade, causing its economy to collapse and unable to sustain the war machine. From that conclusion, Japanese officers reasoned that in total modern wars of a longer duration, combatant nations would no longer be able to depend just on their own resources. For the manufacture and operation of military equipment, nations would need to secure supply of commodities such as coal, oil and iron ore. And indeed, one of the primary reasons driving Japan’s decision to go to war with the Anglo-American powers was the desire for economic autarky which was very similar to Nazi Germany’s desire for economic autarky which in turn motivated its decision to invade the Soviet Union. If a combatant nation is endowed with vast amount of natural resources within its border, it will have no difficulty obtaining the materials needed for its factories. Otherwise, it will have to import it from somewhere else. With regards to Japan, being poor in natural resources and being an island nation, it needed to import raw materials for its factories and foods for its population from colonies of the empire: Taiwan, Korea, China, and Southeast Asia. The primary means of transport was of course: merchant ships. (On a related note, merchant shipping was absolutely necessary because unlike the highly industrialized Europe, most of Southeast Asia was poor, agrarian with no or limited industrial capacity provided by European imperialist powers. Hence, while Germans were able to utilize the existing factories in France or Czechslovakia to produce weapons/repair vehicles locally, there were no large industrial complex in Southeast Asia which the Japanese could use to turn raw materials into finished products. All production had to be done in Japan.) Unfortunately for the Japanese, they never had sufficient merchant shipping capacity to sustain its war economy. Japanese war planners estimated that Japan needed about 10,000,000 tons of shipping just to maintain her economy. However in 1941, only about 6,000,000 tons bore the Rising Sun flag. The rest had been supplied before the war by nations who would later become Japan’s enemy: Britain, Netherlands, Norway, etc… After its conquest of European-controlled Southeast Asia, Japan captured about 700,000 tons of merchant shipping which still left a very large deficit. Without sufficient merchant shipping capacity, the Japanese were unable to fully exploit the fruit of their conquest by transporting vast amount of raw materials back to the Home Islands to sustain its war machine. To make matter worse, throughout the war Japan’s merchant fleet suffered heavy destruction by the US naval air force and submarines. American submarines destroyed 55% of Japanese’s merchant fleet, further depriving Japan of much needed raw materials. The Japanese Navy’s parochial and obsession with offensive warfare at the expense of defensive warfare left its merchant fleet vulnerable to the predation of American submarines. The table below shows a summary of Japan’s merchant-shipping tonnages that included losses to all causes as well as tonnage available. By 1945, Japan had lost most of its warships and merchant ships. The amount of imported resources was reduced by 40%. The reduction of imported raw materials reduced production output weapons which adversely affected Japan’s war-fighting ability. The reduction of food imports turned food shortage into food crisis, afflicting million of Japanese with malnourishment which diminish their morale and support for the war. And the harm caused by weak logistical capacity extended to the front line. Japan’s lack of a large fleet of supply ships had far-reaching adverse consequences to the war effort. To understand this, it is necessary to understand the expansion progress of the Japanese Empire and its far-reaching consequences for Japanese war efforts. Japanese Empire at its greatest extent in 1942 Image source: Pacific Crucible - Ian W. Toll The one conspicuous fact conveyed by those 2 maps: The Japanese Empire consisted of landmasses separated by vast stretches of water. When Japan emerged as a regional power in East Asia after it won the 1st Sino-Japanese War, it seized Taiwan (known as Formosa back then) and Korea. The total land area of the Japanese Empire = 243,500 square miles = 145,000 (Japan) + 85,000 (Korea)+ 13,500 (Taiwan). In 1931, Japan seized Manchuria. This added 425,000 square miles to the Empire. In 1937, when the 2nd Sino-Japanese War broke out, Japan controlled a total of 655,000 square miles. In 1941, Japan sent troops to Indochina - by then under the control of French Vichy government. But the French colonial government there was weak. So in effect, the Japanese controlled Indochina. At this stage, Japan controlled an area measuring about 1,600,000 square miles. In the first 4 months of 1942, the Japanese conducted their own Oriental Blitzkrieg against European powers to seize their colonial possessions (Malaya, Singapore, the Philippines, Dutch East Indies). Owing to German victories in Europe, European forces stationed in Asia were weak and were swiftly overcome by the battle-hardened Japanese. Japan emerged victorious and this brought the whole of Southeast Asia under Japanese rule. At this stage, the total land area controlled by Japan was 2,900,000 square miles. This means over a period of just over 10 years (1931–1942), the Empire of Japan witnessed a remarkable expansion from 243,500 square miles to 2,9 million square miles: a growth factor of about 12 times. And that was just land area. Japan’s conquest also brought under her control vast stretch of sea. If sea area is included, the Empire of Japan covered an area measuring 20,000,000 square miles. This rapid territorial expansion created enormous logistical difficulty for Japan. Indeed, Japan’s conquest actually brought more long-term harms than benefits to Japan because the logistics of defending this such an expansive territory was complex and costly. Anticipating attacks by the Allies, the Japanese dispatched troops to garrison and build defense on the Marshalls, Gilbert, Solomons islands in the South and Central Pacific. In particular, the Japanese sought to build a system of air bases on those islands that could provide mutual air support in the event of an Allied attacks. Essentially, they envisioned a building a strong system of island defense to secure the Empire against Allied attack. Unfortunately for the Japanese, they lacked the logistical capacity to realize their vision of a strong island defense system. They did not have the heavy construction equipment employed by the US Navy’s construction battalion (Seebees) to transform rapidly primitive land into air bases. Most of the construction work was done manually by Korean slave labors or using small bulldozers that were far less powerful than American-built bulldozers. The Henderson airfield on Guadalcanal was one example. When the US marines captured the air field, it was not yet finished and the Marines had to complete what construction work that remained. In fact, in the South Pacific, the only decent airbase the Japanese had was on Rabaul. By contrast, the American seebees were able to construct airfield on whatever islands they captured using their heavy construction equipment. Japanese air force officer Masatake Okumiya remarked bitterly that Had Japan possessed even 1/5th of the American capacity for building air bases, the Guadalcanal air campaign might have ended differently. Had we possessed such air bases, we could have brought several times as much power to bear upon the American forces. One of Japan’s greatest blunders in the Pacific War certainly lay in its failure to devote proper study to such matters as logistical and engineering support of our combat air forces. Japanese soldiers also became victims to this weak logistical support. In all Pacific campaigns, Japanese forces operated with shoestring supplies of all kinds: ammunitions, foods and medical care. The lack of supply shipping forced the Japanese to often resort to transporting supplies to their troops by submarines or even destroyers as in the Guadalcanal campaign. Indeed, on New Guinea, Japanese troops relied on Australian rations captured at supply depots or on dead enemy soldiers. In some extreme cases, they resorted to cannibalism to stay alive. Thousands of Japanese soldiers rescued from Guadalcanal were severely malnourished, many were little more than bones covered by skins. Thousands of Japanese troops died from starvation and diseases. Japanese forces on islands bypassed by American forces (island hopping strategy) were weakened by starvation because Imperial HQ decide to write them off which denied them of supplies for the rest of the war. Emaciated Japanese troops on Marshall Islands at the end of the war By contrast, the Allies and in particular the Americans throughout the war received far more logistical support than their Japanese counterparts. The USN had a large fleet of oilers and supply ships that not only provided its carrier task force with the so-called staying power - the ability to remain in combat operation for great length of time (13-16 weeks) but also supply the Marines fighting on Islands with ample supply of ammunitions and foods. Indeed starting since the beginning of 1944, US commanders knew that the US would win the war against Japan because of enormous American material superiority AND the ability of the US military to deliver the massive quantities of supplies to distant battlefields. That logistical capability was something the Japanese could only dream of. Conclusion Being an islands nation poor in natural resources, Japan’s success in the war depended heavily on maritime imports and protection of maritime transport. Astoundingly, the Japanese failed spectacular at that. Their merchant fleet was ravaged by American submarines, thereby depriving them of the vital raw materials for their war machine. Furthermore, the failure to keep their soldiers supplied on far-flung islands led to one defeat after another, loss of territories, the strangling of the Empire and ultimate defeat. All of these failures were simply inexcusable and inconceivable and demonstrated Japanese strategic incompetence and that Japan , as Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox remarked was either unable to understand modern war or not qualified to take part in it. But at the end of the day, despite having had to fight with savagely limited resources, the Japanese consistently put up fierce resistance and made their enemy pay a heavy price in blood. It was a testament to the bravery of the Japanese fighting men that deserved our respect. Reference(s) 1/ Hirohito’s War - Francis Pikes 2/ Implacable Foes - Implacable Foes: War in the Pacific, 1944-1945 - Marc S. Gallicchio and Waldo H. Heinrichs 3/ Zero - Masatake Okumiya 47.3K viewsView 363 upvotesView sharesNot for Reproduction

Re: Quora story on WW II.

Sam Kegley 11:47 AM (55 minutes ago) to Jeff, me, bcc: Charles, bcc: Chuck, bcc: Jesse, bcc: Graydon, bcc: David, bcc: Rick https://www.quora.com/ I know you have always been interested in the events of WW II, son, so I believe the attached information concerning the Japanese inability to win WW II would interest you. You have heard my story of a long-time American sergeant when I was in Japan, saying that Japan wanted American Territory so that they could 'put a lot of rice patties between the Pacific Ocean and the Mississippi River. We attended my brother-in-law, Russ Brown's funeral in Chillicothe yesterday. Russ had Trina's son, RJ, who played football for Zane Trace, and lived with Russ after my sister, Mary Lou's, passing in 2013. RJ is over six feet and has kept up his strength-building. He is a fine-looking young fellow (29) who has been in the US Army for 8 years but told me he will re-enlist soon. He has served in Kuwait overseas. He said their people do not want us there. Japan, In my 1953 and 1954 months there, would have occasional street passersby's saying "GI go home". We get many more hateful comments from our own supposed countrymen today. The USA has not been like Britain in empire-building of conquered territories. Besides crooked deals by our supposed national representatives in Congress, we have helped rebuild the economies of those defeated enemies of ours. Politicians represent themselves when there is a lot of money being doled out, ahead of their patriotism. Otherwise, the land we claim in conquered territories are for the burial of our service people killed there. Dad